April Recap
China at the International Arctic Forum in St. Petersburg; the Arctic at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing; and more
Photo: Polar Research Institute of China, pric.org.cn.
The Fifth International Arctic Forum held in St. Petersburg
Heads of State from Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and a host of delegates from other Arctic and non-Arctic states, together with Russian president Vladimir Putin, convened on St. Petersburg to discuss the near future of the Arctic region. Held between April 9 and 10, the main theme of the forum was the development of the Arctic in material terms, but also to nurture cooperation between the Arctic countries—hence the subheading, "The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue."
Today, China is appearing more frequently in discussions on Arctic development. While this growing presence can partially be explained by China inserting itself into the discussion through its Belt and Road Initiative, the smaller economies of the Arctic have, in particular, come to view deeper engagement with China as a viable path to realize domestic goals.
During this year's plenary session--attended by the Presidents of Finland and Iceland, and the Prime Minister of Norway--China made scant appearance in the talking points. When the moderator, John Fraher from Bloomberg, asked whether Russia, as the largest Arctic economy, was doing enough to ensure the safety and sustainability of shipping activities in the region, Putin made a correction, stating that "Russia is not the biggest economy of the Arctic . . . According to the IMF, in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) terms, it is China that ranks first." This prompted Fraher to ask Putin if he considered China to be an Arctic country and, chuckling, whether this was "a new definition." To this, the Russian president responded, "No, no, no. Just... Bear with me," and continued to list the United States and Canada—clarifying that these were actually Arctic countries—as the second and third largest economies.
Although much of the panel discussion took place outside of the Arctic on other global issues, Fraher returned to the Arctic at the end of the session to ask the participants about China's growing presence in the Arctic. He directed his question to Icelandic President Guðni Jóhannesson, asking what sort of role he saw for China in the Arctic. Jóhannesson replied that,
"Obviously, a big power such as China is interested in observing the changes in the Arctic that we have devoted some of this meeting to. And there is nothing wrong with that. I believe that the government of Iceland is observing Chinese attitudes and initiatives. And it goes without saying that when, and if, a new line of communication opens up, we will have countries on one side, the big countries in the Far East and others: China, Japan, Southeast Asia, so on and so forth. And at the other end, we will have Europe as an end destination and as a possible transit point for further commerce. And it goes without saying that the authorities and companies in China are taking part in this development. So, we as a slightly smaller nation than China will only observe that."
Shortly after, Putin cut off the moderator to point out that the Northern Sea Route will benefit not only China, but all East Asian and Southeast Asian countries.
Jóhannesson’s statement was covered by Chinese Xinhua News as "President of Iceland welcomes China's participation in the Arctic." Among the smaller Arctic countries, China-Iceland relations are perhaps the most mature: China was one of the first countries to show interest in Iceland after the 2008 financial crisis. China’s Xue Long research vessel called port in Iceland after it, as the first Chinese vessel, crossed the Arctic Northeast Passage in 2012. A scientific partnership was established between the countries the same year. The China-Nordic Arctic Research Center in Shanghai was born out of this partnership. The two countries have also exchanged in the geothermal energy sector. Iceland became the first European country to sign a Free Trade Agreement with China in 2013.
As the forum concluded, the news broke that a 1,300 hectares port facility will be built in northeastern Iceland. The port is intended as an "international container port connecting Asia, Europe, and the eastern United States" and will be able to service large container vessels transiting the Arctic. The project is organized between the German Bremenports port management company and Efla, an Icelandic engineering firm.
See also: Mia Bennett: The Arctic shipping route no one’s talking about
China's presence elsewhere at the forum
The Chinese delegation at the forum numbered 72, second only to Norway (88). Among the ten largest delegations, the only other Asian country was Japan (16). The highest ranking government member sent was Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Arken Imirbaki 艾力更·依明巴海, who observed the above-mentioned plenary.
Continued collaboration on physical connectivity infrastructure in the Far East region and cooperation in the marine sciences were the high points of the forum for China. A significant portion of China's delegation was headed by Wang Wentao 王文涛, the Governor of Heilongjiang province. The northern province shares its border with Russia and has thus become a natural partner in the country's development of its Far East region. Currently, ties between Heilongjiang and the Russian Far East are growing through various connectivity projects (See below).
“To compete or to cooperate?”
Russia-correspondents from the People’s Daily have written the most comprehensive overview of the forum for Chinese readers. An article titled “Arctic Development: Competition or Cooperation?” outlines this year’s theme of cooperation and dialogue, and traces some of the recent developments that have taken place in the region. It also repeats the formulation of China’s position on the Arctic region—”不越位，不缺位”—which, in the Arctic context, debuted with Kong Xuanyou 孔铉佑, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, announcing the Arctic white paper last year. The maxim clumsily translates to “to retain a position but not to overstep it.” As the article explains, “to have a seat” emphasizes how China has significant interests in the Arctic, and is playing a constructive role both regionally in the Arctic, and globally with issues such as climate change. However, “not to overstep” refers to the fact that China remains a non-Arctic state which limits its presence in Arctic affairs.
Moreover, the article opens with three bullet-points that describe the Arctic as a “long-frozen treasure trove" and China as an “important stakeholder in Arctic affairs” who “actively plays a constructive role in trans-regional and global issues in the Arctic.”
Russia and China deepen cooperation in polar and marine research
Among the 45 agreements signed at the convention, the Forum’s website lists China with one agreement: the establishing of a joint Arctic Research Center between the Russian Shirshov Institute of Oceanology and the Chinese Qingdao National Laboratory for Marine Science.
Pan Kehou 潘克厚, general secretary of the Qingdao Laboratory, stated that this will help “the two countries foster cooperation in marine science and technology, grow their scientific knowledge of the Arctic, and advance monitoring technologies for Arctic environments.” He also expressed hope that it would built a better environment for the countries to “share their science infrastructure and together cultivate a new generation of Arctic researchers.” According to Pan, the center answers a need to better study the role played by the Arctic in global climate change.
The center will provide a platform for research cooperation and joint expeditions. The two countries held a joint Arctic expedition last year. The two countries also announced new collaborations in deep-sea research this month.
The Arctic at the Second Belt and Road Summit
By far the biggest China news this month was the second Belt and Road Forum (BRF). Held in Beijing from April 25 to 27, it gathered 5000 delegates and heads-of-state from 37 countries.Many observers have discussed the mega-event—and its somewhat rushed execution—as an attempt to re-brand and reclaim the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) after a year of increased scrutiny abroad.
The most noticeable absence this year was the United States as no government representative attended the forum. (In 2017, during the first BRI summit, one U.S. government delegate attended.) Neither did any representatives from the Canadian government take part. The European participants constituted about one-third of the total delegates this year; however, from the five European Arctic countries, only Denmark, Finland, and Sweden were represented by government delegates.
According to a write-up by Xinhua News of all agreements and memoranda made during the three days that the summit lasted:
Denmark, together with 12 other countries, “jointly established the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ port cooperation platform ‘海上丝绸之路’港口合作机制” and issued the “Ningbo Initiative of Port Cooperation on the Maritime Silk Road 海丝港口合作宁波倡议.”
The Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment signed a memorandum with China’s National Energy Administration 国家能源局 on energy sector cooperation. Finland is also listed as having taken part in the launch of the BRI Green Development Alliance 一带一路绿色发展国际联盟 together with the environmental ministries of 24 other countries.
Finally, the governments of China and Sweden entered a bilateral tax treaty.
Compare this to 2017, when Denmark sent their Minister of Equal Opportunities and Nordic Cooperation; Finland sent their Minister of Transportation and Communication; and, while Norway did not participate at the forum itself, the Norwegian Prime Minister had led a large delegation to China one month prior to the summit.
See also: Kevin McGwin: Eating shoots and raising questions, Chinese pandas arrive in Copenhagen (Arctic Today)
Friends and foes of the Belt and Road
Zhang Yao: “Ice Silk Road” framework welcomed by countries, sets new direction for Arctic cooperation (Global Times)—The article cited in the March newsletter has since been translated and published on the English-language website of the Global Times. Changes to the heading reflect a higher confidence than in its Chinese original.
Matthew J. L. Ehret: Canadian panel urges Arctic policy shift (Asia Times)—Writing in the wake of the Arctic Forum, one Canadian “journalist, author and lecturer” called for Canada to join China’s “Polar Silk Road.”
James Stavridis: China Is Joining the Rush for Arctic Riches (Bloomberg)—In stark contrast, former supreme allied commander of NATO, James Stavridis, has written a column for Bloomberg where he links China’s Arctic foray with its “maritime ‘Great Game’” and calls for the U.S. and its NATO allies to expand situational awareness in the Arctic to stay informed on Chinese and Russian activities in the region. Stavridis identifies China’s Arctic ambitions as tightly linked with Russia’s own Arctic strategy.
The Northern Sea Route arrives in Beijing
Putin used the opportunity to market the NSR to the 37 head-of-states present, and echoing his comments at the International Arctic Forum three weeks prior, that the scope of the NSR is to connect the whole of Southeast-, East- and Northeast Asia with markets in Europe, describing it as a “global and competitive route.” In addition, Putin expressed interest in joining the NSR with the BRI, stating that “We . . . consider the possibility to connect it to the Chinese Maritime Silk Road,” and that “Russia is willing to strengthen exchanges and cooperation, and work with China in energy, connectivity and other major projects.”
In an interview with the South China Morning Post, Russian ambassador to China, Andrey Denisov, appeared positive of the deepening partnership between the two countries within the Arctic. Most notably in the natural gas sector. He expressed that Russia-China cooperation in the Far North could be “long-distance and long-time,” including investments in navigation facilities, shipping and aircraft monitoring. He also noted China’s potential role to play in building the new generation of polar icebreakers: “We need icebreakers,” and while Russia possesses sophisticated institutions for developing and building new such ships, the ambassador added that “China has experience in building icebreakers and passing through the route too.”
See also: China and Russia forge stronger Eurasian economic ties (South China Morning Post)
Marc Lanteigne: Russia Reinforces its Arctic Policies (With China Alongside)
Putin Steps Up Talks With Beijing Over Arctic Shipping (The Moscow Times)
Liu Qun: Jointly build the “Polar Silk Road”
Leading up to the event, state media has been awash with Belt and Road coverage. Liu Qun 刘群, who is the director of the Department of Strategy and Defense 战略与防务一室 at the International College of Defense Studies at the National Defense University 国防大学国际防务学院, has contributed a column to the China Investment 中投 magazine. He writes of the “natural advantages of the ‘Polar Silk Road’” which by now have been repeated ad nauseam. Of note, he describes the Arctic shipping routes as “golden waterways” which “might become important shipping lanes for trade between China and Europe.”
He references the “辽海欧” project, developed by COSCO and Department of Transportation in the northeastern Liaoning province. The project seeks to link Liaoning (辽), through maritime shipping (海), with European markets (欧). More concretely, as Liu writes, it aims to connect the industrial hub and port city of Dalian, through the Bering Strait to northern Norway, then towards shipping hubs in Europe. To this end, he also noted the investments made by China Poly Group 中国保利集团 for the construction of the Arkhangelsk deep-water port.
On the topic of technology and engineering, Russia is seen to possess “plentiful experience with construction work in the Arctic,” while China “owns specialized technology for construction on permafrost and in cold-weather regions.”
The Polar Code is also mentioned. Liu sees a point of potential cooperation between Russia and China in meeting the “high technological requirements” set out by the Code that went into effect in 2017. Additionally, “with the advancement of shipping technology and infrastructure development, Chinese merchant vessels will start to make more frequent trips over the Arctic to Europe.”
Finally, he writes that “the development of Arctic shipping is currently facing numerous challenges, including the delimitation of the Arctic itself; the control of Arctic waterways, use of maritime space and shipbuilding in the context of the Polar Code; harsh ice and atmospheric conditions limiting navigation; lack of infrastructure; high pilotage fees; heightening military competition between great powers in and around the Arctic ocean … .“
Liu concludes that a long and hard road lies ahead of realizing the potential of Arctic shipping and that “building the ‘Polar Silk Road’ will require the concerted efforts of the international community as a whole.”
Zhang Tingting: The "Polar Silk Road” helps connect Eurasia
Similarly, China National Defense News 中国国防报 published a shorter piece on the Polar Silk Road. Written by Zhang Tingting 张婷婷, assistant researcher at Renmin University 人民大学 in Beijing, she points out that the China-Russian Arctic partnership constitutes an illustrative case of the kind of partner relationships and divisions of labor envisioned with the BRI framework. First, the partnership is founded on "Russia's expert knowledge of Arctic resources and the Arctic environment, and on China's construction and financial strengths." The Yamal LNG project—one of the crown jewels of the BRI— is a case in point; having been been made possible in part by the technical and financial capacity of various Chinese state-owned enterprises.
At the same time, local connectivity projects, notably the Finland-Norway Arctic Corridor proposed last year, represent potential points of cooperation; areas where local initiatives can be linked with the Polar Silk Road project. The successful development of the Northern Sea Route and other related infrastructure projects is in turn set to transform the Nordic region from being "at the edge of Europe to being a gateway to Europe."
Zhang emphasizes that the Arctic is "the last treasure trove on Earth," (if you exclude the Antarctic?) and this necessarily puts extra pressure on stakeholders to find sustainable solutions. To this end, China, "as a near-Arctic country," has consistently shown its commitment to understanding and protecting the environment and local ecologies through its investments in polar and marine science.
The other side of the “Polar Silk Road”
19th-century territorial concessions, worries over environmental degradation and exploitative labor conditions are among the potential flash points as Chinese companies enter projects in Russia’s Far East region.
Leon Aron: Are Russia and China Really Forming an Alliance? (Foreign Affairs)
Nicholas Trickett: Putin in Beijing: What Drives China-Russia Relations? (The Diplomat)
Chinese in the Russian Far East: a geopolitical time bomb? (South China Morning Post)
Josephine Ma: Chinese expansion in Central Asia no threat to Moscow, Russian ambassador says (South China Morning Post)
Two Chinese energy majors sign on to second Russian LNG project
One major Arctic announcement during this year’s BRF, however, was the news that two Chinese state-owned, CNOOC and China National Oil and Gas Exploration Company, a CNPC subsidiary, each will take a 10% stake in the Novatek-led Arctic LNG 2 Project. CNPC already holds a 20% stake in the neighboring Yamal LNG project.
A set of three liquefaction trains with an estimated per annum output of 6.6 million tons each is planned for the project that is in the early phase of construction. The March newsletter covered the Chinese fabrication yards bidding for contracts to construct modules for the project’s first liquefaction train.
This is the third large-scale LNG project in the Arctic with Chinese equity following Yamal LNG and LNG Canada. Besides Yamal LNG, Canada LNG, which estimates 14 million tons per annum at capacity, has seen another CNPC subsidiary, PetroChina, take a 15% interest.
Several infrastructure projects on China-Russian border in the works
On April 2, the first cross-border railway bridge between China and Russia was completed. The bridge links the northern Chinese province of Heilongjiang with Russia’s Jewish Autonomous Oblast. More specifically, the successful completion of marks the first rail link between the Chinese city of Tongjiang 同江 and the Russian counterpart of Nizhneleninskoye. The bridge crosses the Amur River (also the namesake of the Chinese Heilongjiang province, the “Black Dragon River”).
The project was given full-page coverage in The People’s Daily. One worker who took part in the project said to the newspaper that “I am a second-generation bridge-builder. My father worked on the Wuhan Yangtze River Bridge. The Soviets took part in that project.” Some continuity in China-Russia relations. The article describes several new cold-region engineering techniques employed during the bridge’s construction. Winter temperatures often dip below -30°C. It is also the first Chinese-built bridge to use steel beams specially manufactured to withstand extreme weather as low as -60°C.
The plan for the two-lane, 2200m-long highway bridge was floated by the Russian side in 2007. Construction started in late December 2016. For a time, the project came to be seen as a manifestation of the China and Russia’s uncertain relationship, with the Russian side of the bridge standing unfinished long after the Chinese had completed their section.
While the bridge will boost cross-border connectivity across the board, transportation of industrial inputs from Russia—particularly steel sector inputs—to China will see the most immediate improvement by cutting down transportation time significantly.
Shipping and Shipbuilding
COSCO takes the lead in the Arctic
Leading up to the BRF, China Central Television (CCTV) aired a series on the BRI called “Building the Belt and Road Together, Creating a Beautiful Future [共建’一带一路’，开创美好未来].” One segment was on the role of COSCO, China’s largest shipping conglomerate. Although mainly focused on the Greek Port of Piraeus where COSCO now is the majority stakeholder, Arctic shipping was mentioned as part of the expanding web of transportation infrastructure under the BRI. A two-second bit showed the Korean-built, Russian-operated LNG carrier Christopher de Margerie making its way through Arctic ice.
Photo: Sofreight.com. The map has been cropped, leaving out several North- and South American ports. The Port of Peru, in particular, is emphasized as a node in the BRI network.
In addition, COSCO published a recap of their BRI-related activities last year, including the above map. The map plots in the various shipping lanes, transportation corridors, and logistical hubs that make up the current infrastructure network.
The pink dotted line represents the Arctic shipping lane(s) [“北极航线”]. From East to West, it originates in Lianyungang 连云港, China, and terminates in Rotterdam. Looking at these end-points, the line traces the Northeast Passage through the Northern Sea Route. Lianyungang is a major port in China’s Jiangsu province. During the summers of 2017 and 2018, COSCO multipurpose cargo carriers Tian Jian 天健, Tian En 天恩, and Tian Hui 天惠 all departed from said port to their various destinations in Denmark, France, and Sweden.
With its Specialized Carriers arm, COSCO has become the most active shipping company outside of Russia when it comes to Arctic shipping. In 2018, it completed eight sailings across the Arctic, a feat which it described as the "normalization" and "standardization" of Arctic shipping. Yong Sheng 永盛 made the inaugural sailing in August 2013 from Taicanggang 太仓港, another Jiangsu port, to Rotterdam—the first Chinese merchant ship to transit the Arctic. As of 2018, the company has completed 22 Arctic sailings with 15 different vessels (and one Antarctic sailing).
On April 11, the company held a kickoff meeting for the 2019 season. This year, COSCO “will plan sailings according to project needs” and “continue to implement the large-scale operation of the Northeast Passage,” the press release stated. While particular sailings haven’t been disclosed, COSCO representatives have indicated that this year will see eight sailings, resembling last season, but have the capacity to add more sailings according to demand.
Late last year, the “The Confidence of China [国之自信]” TV program aired an episode on COSCO Specialized Carriers. Deputy-manager, Cai Meijiang 蔡梅江, was interviewed and stressed the lack of infrastructure and past sailing experience as factors that make Arctic navigation perilous, and thereby also impressive. Captain Zhang Yutian 张玉田 also made an appearance with what looked like a model of Tian Jian 天健 or Tian Qi 天琪. He described in more detail the dangers of Arctic navigation and the experience of voyaging in the High North.
On the topic of Arctic shipping, two questions remain constant: the near-future commercial feasibility of shipping using Arctic sea lanes, and the level of interest in Arctic shipping held by Asian, American, and European stakeholders compared with conventional shipping via the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Russia envisions up to 80 million tons of cargo to move through its NSR by 2024. Roughly 20 million tons were shipped in 2018. A January study by researchers at the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen Institute concludes that the East Asian states, China included, hold a cautious attitude towards potential shipping prospects in the Far North, with relevant investments and policy moving ahead slowly.
Looking at new shipping fleet investments strengthens this conclusion. Most notably, China’s second largest shipyard in terms of tonnage, Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding 上海外高桥造船有限公司, recently launched the largest container carrier ever built in China. The ship is commissioned by COSCO, has a 20,110 TEU carrying capacity, is 400m long and 58.6m wide. It is the second largest Chinese container ship after the Universe (21,237 TEU), also operated by COSCO. The vessel is the first newbuilding to be launched after COSCO placed an order for 11 such ships in 2015. The remaining ten orders are spread around several Chinese shipyards.
COSCO’s investment in its ultra-large container fleet takes advantage of economies of scale that, at least for the foreseeable future, the NSR does not allow. As many have noted, the environmental and technical challenges posed by Arctic shipping runs counter to current logistical models that favor just-in-time delivery and economies of scale. Port infrastructure remains underdeveloped for ultra-large carriers along the Russian Arctic coast. And even Russia’s largest nuclear icebreakers are not up to the task to open channels wide enough for today’s largest cargo carriers, instead requiring up to two icebreakers as escort (Recent innovations in icebreaker designs, such as the Russian Baltika icebreaker which can break ice obliquely, may alleviate this issue somewhat.)
See other mega-news this month: John Snyder: China to develop world’s largest LNG carrier to meet its surging demand (LNG World Shipping)
With China’s coal-to-gas shift now in full effect, the country’s demand for natural gas has grown tremendously in recent years. Gas imports grew by 32% year-on-year in 2018. While pipelines are underway, China has come to take much of its gas imports as LNG from countries such as Australia, Qatar—and more recently, Russia.
However, the building of LNG carriers has become South Korea’s domain. Last year, its shipyards received over 80% of the orders for LNG carriers globally. China, on the other hand, received zero. Currently, the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard 沪东中华造船厂 in Shanghai is the only Chinese shipyard to currently construct large-scale LNG tankers. In January of this year, COSCO ordered two 178,000-cbm carriers from the yard on a speculative basis.
Chinese shipyard tapped to build ice-capable, LNG-powered cargo vessels for Swedish shipping company
While not strictly polar news, Chinese shipbuilder CIMC Raffles 中集来福士海洋工程有限公司 has been awarded a contract by Swedish shipping start-up Wallenius SOL to build four large-scale ro-ro cargo vessels. A ro-ro vessel is a cargo carrier designed to transport cars and other forms of wheeled cargo.
The vessels will be 242m long, 35m wide with a cargo deck of approximately 11,600sqm. Areas of operation include the Bothnia Gulf, Baltic Sea and the North Sea, hence the ships are being designed for a 1A Super ice class notation that allows operation in harsh environments and ice thickness up to 1.0m. The press release from CIMC called the ships “aircraft carrier-sized.”
According to CIMC, preliminary concept design was developed by Danish naval architect Knud E. Hansen. Now, basic design will be completed by Hansen in collaboration with two CIMC subsidiaries, its Offshore Engineering Institute and Bassoe Technology, a ship and offshore design house based in Gothenburg, Sweden. Bassoe was acquired by CIMC in 2013.
Chinese yard finishes work on 2,150 TEU ice class container carrier
Early April saw the undocking of a 2,150 TEU container carrier for Royal Arctic Line, the government-owned Greenlandic shipping company. The vessel is the second to be built by the Chinese shipyard after a 3+3 agreement was signed. Vessel design has been delivered by Finnish Deltamarine with all ships being Polar Code-compliant.
Getting acclimated: By now, Chinese shipyards have already delivered significant tonnage of this ice class, largely for trade in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea, indicating the increasingly mature capabilities of certain yards to build ice-capable and winterized vessels. Recently, COSCO Zhoushan Shipyard 舟山中远海运重工 delivered its seventh 3,600 TEU container carrier to Maersk for trading in North European waters. This string of ships all have a Baltic 1A ice class notation.
Similarly, in March, Shanghai Shipyard 上海造船厂 launched the world’s first ice-capable break bulk carrier for Latvian shipping company PlatanoEsti OU. The 106,000-deadweight ton vessel is sufficiently winterized for Arctic sailings in air temperatures down to -25°C. It has a Polar Class 6 notation. The 157-year old shipyard is the same yard that delivered Tian En 天恩, Tian Hui 天惠 and Tian You 天佑, the three Arc4 ice-strengthened 36,000-ton multipurpose carriers that COSCO special-ordered for its Arctic sailings.
See also: SunStone Orders Sixth Infinity Cruise Vessel (Maritime Executive)
The March newsletter noted the launch of the first polar cruise vessel out of a 4+4 order by SunStone. This month, SunStone returned for new orders. The vessels are built to Polar Code 6 standards with a Ice Class 1A notation.
Science and Research
National Meteorological Bureau publishes blue book on climate change
This month, China’s top meteorological body issued its annual report on the effect of climate change on China’s territory. In short, China is warming. This upward trend in mean temperature is seen most clearly in northern and high-altitude regions. Tibet has seen the highest temperature increase with 0.37°C per decade since 1981.
The country’s glaciers are retreating. This is starkly illustrated by the Urumqi Glacier No. 1 in northwestern Xinjiang province. According to the report, last year, the East and West sections of the glacier shrunk 8.3m and 5.9m respectively.
The Tibetan permafrost is thawing. According to observations along the Tibetan-Qinghai highway, the active soil layer—the vertical area of soil that thaws during summer—has thickened with about 19.5cm per decade.
The blue book also mentions the changes in sea ice extent in the polar regions.
Ministry of Natural Resources announces several polar science positions for recent graduates
Every year, positions earmarked for fresh university graduates at the country’s many research institutions are announced. This year’s announcement included several polar science openings:
Polar research and the effects of ocean-atmosphere interactions at the First Institute of Oceanography 第一海洋研究所 in Qingdao;
Polar marine research, numerical forecasting and polar marine science fieldwork at the National Marine Environment Forecasting Center 国家海洋环境预报中心 in Beijing;
Polar weather and climate research, numerical forecasting and climate research fieldwork at the National Marine Environment Forecasting Center;
At the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai:
Research on polar global governance with a focus on research on international law and governance in the polar regions, and research on issues related to polar policy and planning;
Research on geophysics and ice sheet evolution mechanisms using aerial observational data in the Antarctic;
Research on the atmospheric and environmental effects on ice sheets, mainly in the Antarctic;
Sea ice research and observational study of sea-ice interactions;
Polar radar survey, research on the ionosphere, upper- and middle atmospheres in the polar regions.
Various positions at one of the country’s six (soon to be seven) polar research stations have also been announced:
Operation and management of ICT at research stations in the Arctic or the Antarctic;
Management of machinery and mobile systems;
Logistical management;
Management and operation of electrical systems.
As well as on one of its two polar research vessels:
Fourth engineer;
Systems engineer;
Telecommunication engineer;
Third officer.
Xue Long to undergo renovation later this year
A post on the website of PRIC is inviting quotations for technical supervision services in connection with a “major overhaul project” due to start sometime in 2019. The notice states that “PRIC plans to carry out a major overhaul [of the Xue Long research icebreaker]” this year and is now looking for someone “to ensure the quality of the ship maintenance work, equipment inspection and project supervision.”
This ship has undergone two major renovations in the past, one in 2007 and one in 2013.
Peer-reviewed publications this month
Not an exhaustive list by any means, but a few academic papers published this month:
Ye Binhong 叶滨鸿, Cheng Yang 程杨, Wang Li 王利 and Yang Linsheng 杨林生: “A Systematic Review of Arctic Geopolitic Research”—The authors, who belong to Beijing Normal University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, have conducted a meta-study of geopolitical research in and about the Arctic region during the last two decades. Their sample includes 289 English-language peer-reviewed articles and 596 Chinese-language articles. Their findings are that (1) the rate of publication grew significantly after 2009, with a relatively low number of articles being published prior to that year; (2) that a majority of English-language research was concerned with issues of sovereignty and the legal status continental shelves, and with Arctic natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons. In Chinese-language articles, one major focus have been geopolitical relations and the United States, Russia and Canada. Other prominent topics were China’s participation in Arctic affairs and governance of the Arctic and commercial Arctic shipping.
Luo Qiaoyun 骆巧云, Liu Wei 刘伟 and Shou Jianmin 寿建敏: “The Economic Viability of Asia-Europe Container Transport Through Arctic Sea Routes and the Influence of Sea Ice”—The authors analysis the economic feasibility of Arctic commercial container shipping by comparing the economics of transiting the Arctic with those of the Suez Canal from Shanghai to Rotterdam. The analysis takes into account the economics of three separate ice classes—ARC4, ARC5, and ARC7— and of different ports of origin and container types. The cost comparison concludes that ARC5 vessels strike the best balance between carrier capacity and costs. ARC7 vessels come in second due to their high building costs. On the other hand, the cost competitiveness of ARC4 ships become more apparent when considering different ports of departure. For their calculations, the authors take the COSCO-owned 4,250 TEU vessel Xin Bei Lun 新北仑 as model.
Yang Xianbin 杨显滨: “On the Application of the ‘Ice Clause’ in the UNCLOS on the Northwest Passage”—International legal studies articles on UNCLOS Article 234 are a dime a dozen and rarely contribute anything meaningful to the overall discussion. This one is no exception. One interesting bit, however, is found in the conclusion, where the author writes that “China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a ‘near-Arctic’ state, an observer to the Arctic Council and a responsible great power. We have the right, and an obligation, to participate in the governance of the Northwestern Passage (NWP) and to maintain the global maritime order.”
It goes on state that, “while China must respect the rights of Arctic states, it should provide channels for fair, rational and equal conciliation . . . actively participate in governing the NWP in order to guarantee China’s interests. Such as energy, shipping, trade, military, national defense and other areas of security. This would be helped by promoting ‘the 'Belt and Road Initiative’ and by building ‘the Polar Silk Road.’ To this end, then, China should consider the following positions and suggestions: (1) In the international community, advocate for the establishment of a “double exclusion mechanism [双重排除机制]” that applies to the Ice Clause.” The author describes this so-called “double exclusion mechanism” as consisting of “refuting Canada’s historical waters claim” and “when defining the legal status of the NWP, exclude the Ice Clause by employing maritime law on straits for international navigation;
(2) For the Ice Clause and its applicability in territorial waters, pursue the ‘principle of prohibition [禁止原则] ‘ and delimit its applicability to between the 200 nautical miles of the exclusive economic zone (excluding territorial waters);
(3) Propose to establish a mechanism for restraining the use of the Ice Clause that uses the climate as a standard measure to determine the applicability to the Ice Clause along the NWP. At the same time, take into account the rights, interests, and demands of other states, strive to gain international recognition and support, and seek to make it customary law. Then, when the time is right, relevant provisions can be written into the UNCLOS;
(4) Propose that the Ice Clause, as it is relevant to the NWP, must take into consideration the freedom and safety of navigation of other states. Propose practicable standards based on the sovereign rights of states and the prohibition against power abuses by states;
(5) As for parts of the NWP not covered by sea ice, we should strictly adhere to Art. 59 of UNCLOS [Basis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone] and the principle of fairness, take into consideration Canada’s maritime rights and safeguard the navigational freedoms of other states along the NWP.”